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THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA. By Lee C. Bollinger. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1986. Pp. viii, 295. $19.95.
Reviewed by Steven C. Bennett*
INTRODUCTION
Lee C. Bollinger, a Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School and noted expert on the first amendment,'
in his new book, The Tolerant Society,2 confronts the riddle of
extremist speech. Why is it, he wonders, that we universally con-
demn a group like the American Nazis and yet permit them to
disrupt a community like Skokie, Illinois, all in the name of pro-
tecting the first amendment?8 Professor Bollinger suggests that
an examination of how our legal system treats extremist speech
can help us develop a general vision of the meaning of the first
amendment.4 Rejecting two alternative theories, Professor Bol-
linger suggests a "tolerance"5 model of the first amendment. Our
society, according to Professor Bollinger, permits extremist
speech not simply because it advances some well-accepted goals
(like better government or increased self-expression), or because
it is impossible to prohibit some undesirable speech without
"chilling" other protected speech. Rather, protection of extrem-
ist speech serves more as a collective exercise in self-restraint.
Intolerance manifests itself in many areas outside the context of
* Associate, Sullivan and Cromwell, New York City; B.A. 1979, Macalester College;
J.D. 1984, New York University School of Law.
1. Professor Bollinger has written several essays on first amendment issues. See, e.g.,
Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regula-
tion of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellec-
tual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438 (1983); Bollinger, The Sedition of Free Speech, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 867 (1983); Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and
Free Speech Theory (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982).
2. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA (1986) [hereinafter cited as L. BOLLINGER].
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 41.
5. Professor Bollinger defines "tolerance" as "a special act of carving out one area of
social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and
demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters."
Id. at 10.
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extremist speech (racial and religious discrimination, for exam-
ple). By permitting extremist speech, our society publicly and
dramatically affirms the desirability of tolerance in areas outside
the context of speech. In a very important way, society adds
something to its identity by permitting extremist speech.' In ad-
vancing this novel explanation, Professor Bollinger hopes to fill
a "disturbing lacuna" in our first amendment theories, and to
provide a basis from which to approach the task of deciding ac-
tual cases.' This review will briefly summarize Professor Bollin-
ger's argument, and then consider its viability both as a general
theory and as a tool for deciding cases.
I.
Professor Bollinger divides his book into eight chapters,
with an introduction. The introduction acquaints the reader
with the general problem Professor Bollinger wishes to explore.
The introduction reminds us that the United States is alone
among free societies in permitting a broad range of extremist
speech.9 Yet our jurisprudence on extremist speech is relatively
young (some sixty or so years old).10 Professor Bollinger suggests
that the theory supporting that jurisprudence is, as yet, still in-
complete. Much of contemporary first amendment theory, he
notes, talks in terms of the benefits of free speech (like discover-
ing the truth). Yet extremist speech is not best understood on
the level of benefits from the speech itself. Instead, Professor
Bollinger introduces the notion of tolerance-teaching as the
main function of cases involving extremist speech. 2
The first chapter of the book outlines an example of ex-
tremist speech mentioned throughout the remainder of the book.
Professor Bollinger proposes to test his theory and competing
theories against a real example, the case of the Nazi march
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Professor Bollinger traces the origins of modern free speech doctrine to Justice
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). See id. at 15.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 9-10.
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through Skokie.' 3 Professor Bollinger sees, in the public and ju-
dicial responses to the Skokie affair, a curious disjunction in at-
titudes about the degree to which we tolerate extremist speech.
He notes, for example, that the judges who wrote the various
Skokie opinions uniformly condemned Nazism, yet insisted that
protection of first amendment values demanded the result
obtained.
14
The next two chapters explore contemporary theories of the
first amendment. One theory, the "Classical Model," focuses on
the benefits of speech. These benefits include the importance of
speech for getting at the truth, its function as a form of self-
expression, and its aid to effective government. 5 The Classical
Model requires that the harms of speech be weighed against all
these important benefits. Professor Bollinger insists, however,
that the Classical Model cannot explain the results in many ex-
tremist speech cases, like Skokie. The Nazi speech in Skokie had
virtually no benefits as an exercise in truth-seeking. Indeed,
Nazi propaganda deliberately intends to subvert the truth. In its
application, then, the Classical Model may fail in extremist
speech cases.
Professor Bollinger also assesses the other major contempo-
rary theory of the first amendment, the "Fortress Model." On
this theory, extremist speech must be protected not only for its
own sake but as a means of clearly demarcating the lines of pro-
tected speech.' 6 Professor Bollinger criticizes this model for its
wrong-headed assumption that the suppression of extremist
speech is invariably the product of a tyrannical government bent
on suppressing individual liberties. Rather, he suggests, most
13. Frank Collin and a small group of Nazis intended to demonstrate in Skokie, a
suburb of Chicago whose heavily Jewish population includes concentration camp survi-
vors. Under pressure from a group of those survivors, Skokie's leaders decided to actively
oppose the demonstration. They obtained several injunctions against it, and passed three
ordinances to prevent its occurrence. The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
then came to the Nazi's aid. It won four court decisions that overturned all the ordi-
nances and injunctions. Eventually, however, Collin and his group agreed to hold their
rally elsewhere. The story is outlined in Professor Bollinger's book, id. at 24-35, and is
recounted in greater detail in earlier works, see, e.g., D. HAMLIN, THE NAZI/SKOKIE CON-
FLICT (1980); A. NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY; AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND
THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979).
14. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 27-28.
15. Id. at 46-47.
16. Id. at 77.
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censorship is perfectly attuned with the will of the majority.
That observation, he notes, runs counter to the suggestion in the
Fortress theory that extremist speech (such as that of the Nazis)
must be protected in order to protect ordinary political criti-
cism." Moreover, he observes, this model does not entirely ac-
count for the depth of our society's commitment to the free
speech principle. He phrases a poignant question: "[i]f we ever
came to feel that the opportunities for our own speech as well as
for other speech we genuinely value were totally secure ...
would we still have good reason for taking the free speech prin-
ciple to the extreme position ... T'18
In chapter four, Professor Bollinger elucidates his alterna-
tive, "Tolerance Model" of the first amendment. He begins by
noting the universality of the urge to intolerance, the desire to
insist strongly on our own beliefs and values. 9 Intolerance takes
many forms: racial and religious prejudice, sexism, and the sup-
pression of unusual lifestyles are only a few examples. How to
control these impulses? They cannot be forbidden altogether.
There is a wide range of activities (dangerous sexual practices
and drug use, for example) which our society regulates largely on
the basis of intolerance, but which probably should be regu-
lated.2 0 The intolerant impulse must be controlled more subtly.
Thus, we arrive at the heart of Professor Bollinger's model. The
protection of extremist speech follows from a need to demon-
strate extraordinary restraint in a limited setting in order to en-
courage tolerance in other areas."
The remainder of Professor Bollinger's book explores the
implications of his Tolerance Model. For example, can this
model be integrated into contemporary thinking about the first
amendment? Professor Bollinger suggests that some strands of
his theory appear in the works of other major theorists. 2 He also
reminds us that the process of resolving first amendment claims
is as important as the resolution itself. 23 Finally, he explores rea-
17. Id. at 78-79.
18. Id. at 103.
19. Id. at 111-12.
20. Id. at 113.
21. Id. at 122-23.
22. Professor Bollinger compares his theory with those of Alexander Meiklejohn and
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Id. at 145-74.
23. Id. at 235.
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sons why tolerance has become such an important value in the
United States, suggesting that the combination of a capitalist
economy (with its emphasis on individual effort) and the devel-
opment of a bureaucratic state (which requires government ac-
tors to submerge their individual prejudices) has produced our
unusual emphasis on tolerance.2 4
II.
Professor Bollinger's Tolerance Model is certainly a valua-
ble insight into the role of free speech in our society. But can his
theory help us to solve the practical problems of regulating ex-
tremist speech? Professor Bollinger deliberately omits any ex-
tended treatment of these practical implications. He suggests,
quite correctly, that any full-scale treatment of the doctrinal ef-
fects of his model would require more than a single book.25 Nev-
ertheless, he does provide at least a peek at what his theory
might mean for first amendment doctrine. This brief discussion,
unfortunately, suggests that Professor Bollinger's theory pro-
vides little concrete value as an aid in deciding cases.
Professor Bollinger's biggest problem in describing the prac-
tical operation of his theory is that he is willing to consider too
many opposing arguments. He begins by asserting that "[flree
speech does not and can not mean that we will suffer any and all
consequences that speech may bring. ' '2' He then considers some
well-recognized "exceptions" where speech may be regulated
(fighting words, libel, pornography) and criticizes the Supreme
Court's analysis of these exceptions. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,2 7 for example, the Court suggested that "such utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."'28 Professor Bollinger criticizes
the Chaplinsky reasoning for assuming that the value of speech
is the critical inquiry in first amendment analysis. "[I]t is not
the absence of social value that determines whether the princi-
24. Id. at 239.
25. Id. at 175.
26. Id. at 176.
27. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28. Id. at 572.
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ple of free speech is applicable; indeed, the perceived absence of
value is, if anything, a major reason for protection, or more accu-
rately, for toleration . ... 
We might assume from this criticism that the Tolerance
Model requires that we permit even the most extreme speech.
Professor Bollinger quickly backpedals, however: "this is not to
say that toleration of, or self-restraint toward, all speech is man-
dated under the broader objectives of the first amendment ...
Certain extraordinary times and conditions exist in any society
in which it is quite simply too much to expect of people that
they be self-restrained .... "" So, we are back to some excep-
tions. Yet, even these exceptions can go too far, as Professor
Bollinger suggests in considering the fighting words exception:
"On the other hand, we face a difficult problem of containing
such an exception, as many quickly realized, for, if given a loose
rein, it could ride roughshod over the entire purpose of free
speech."31 Unfortunately, there are just too many "on the other
hands" in this analysis.
What's left is a deliberately vague approach to resolving
cases. Professor Bollinger admits as much: "it would seem advis-
able to prefer an abstract-indeed, one might even say, a consci-
entiously ambiguous doctrinal standard."82 Professor Bollinger
prefers the "clear and present danger" test first proposed by
Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United states,3" and Abrams v.
United States.8
4
What are we to make of this approach? We may-begin by
observing that the Holmes approach hardly provided enduring
protection for free speech. A formula that was initially applied
to permit extremist speech even if it had some "tendency" to
disrupt government 5 was quickly reinterpreted (though the
29. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 182.
30. Id. (Emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 183.
32. Id. at 192-93.
33. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
34. 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2,
at 193 (referring to Holmes' "clear and present danger" standard).
35. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (reversing a conviction for violat-
ing a statute prohibiting attempts to incite insurrection); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 359-60 (1937) (indicating that peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be
made a crime; incitement must be shown).
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words of the formula were not abandoned) amidst the paranoid
hysteria of the McCarthy era to forbid even the advocacy of vio-
lent overthrow of the government."6 Professor Bollinger accepts
this indictment, but he suggests that it simply means that no
formula can be written with sufficient certainty to resist the
tides of intolerance that may flow in certain circumstances.
3 7
If the Tolerance Model is not intended to create a more cer-
tain standard, what good is it? Professor Bollinger's answer is
essentially that the process is more important than the result.
The goal, he reminds us, is to provide an example of tolerance
for the public to observe. This teaching is not done by robot-like
application of a fixed formula. Instead, society must know that
tolerance is a conscious exercise of will. By weighing the many
factors involved in an extremist speech case judges can publicly
proclaim the importance of the tolerance principle. Indeed, on
this view, extensive litigation in a first amendment case (which a
more certain standard might avoid) is desirable: "[1]itigation
provides the framework, the occasion, for the community to
think about the things free speech is intended to raise for
thought." 8
This observation, while unique3" and significant, does little
to help us decide cases. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a
judge could operationalize Professor Bollinger's theory. Surely a
judge cannot admit that the outcome of a case is unimportant so
long as the tolerance principle is publicly explored. Nor can a
judge simply weigh tolerance as an additional value on the side
of preserving speech. Professor Bollinger's point is that tolerance
is most demonstrated when there is virtually no value to the ex-
tremist speech.40 Thus, the need to teach tolerance is not just
another value that may tip the balance in favor of protecting
36. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324 (1957); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
37. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 194.
38. Id. at 195.
39. Many other scholars, of course, have remarked on the instructive effects of law,
those going beyond the immediate effects of a decision. See, e.g., Burt, Constitutional
Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 471-72 (1984) (suggesting that
constitutional decisions essentially use the same methods as the parables of the Gospel);
West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985) (suggesting that modern jurisprudence follows four classical
literary myths). Professor Bollinger's tolerance perspective, however, appears unique.
40. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 182.
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speech. Tolerance is a trump card, or it means virtually nothing.
As we find in looking at Professor Bollinger's primary example
of extremist speech, Skokie, the latter is more likely the case.
III.
Professor Bollinger uses the Skokie case as an example for
testing the adequacy of the contemporary first amendment mod-
els. He concludes that neither of these models adequately ex-
plains the result in Skokie. Does his Tolerance Model do a bet-
ter job? To begin to answer this question, we must briefly
summarize Professor Bollinger's application of the Tolerance
Model to the Skokie case.
Professor Bollinger begins by suggesting that Skokie was
the perfect case for demonstrating tolerance: the potential for
excessive intolerance (based on hatred of the Nazis) was great,
and the case also attracted widespread public attention.4 1 These
facts apparently would lead to a presumption in favor of
42tolerance.
s
Professor Bollinger proceeds, however, to consider the
harms of tolerance, including the risk that tolerance might con-
stitute an implicit condonation of Nazism and the risk of serious
psychic injury to the Skokie residents.'3 Professor Bollinger con-
cludes that these harms would not outweigh the benefits of dem-
onstrating tolerance."
It is possible, of course, to contest Professor Bollinger's as-
sessment of the harms involved in the Skokie case. One might
suggest, for example, that he underplays the extent of the inju-
ries suffered by the Skokie residents. 5 One might also question
the validity of some of his empirical observations. He suggests,
for example, that "[wihile anti-Semitism is a problem in Ameri-
can society. . . it is not of such magnitude, or so pervasive, as to
transform toleration into an act of implicit condonation.
' '
14
41. Id. at 197-98.
42. Id. at 199 (referring to presumption).
43. Id. at 199-200.
44. Id. at 199.
45. See D. DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE 28-29, 84-91 (1985) (describing the intent of the
organizers and assessing harms based on interviews with leaders of Skokie's survivor
community).
46. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 199.
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These potential criticisms are minor compared to the more
potent observation that in this, the quintessential example of
the need for tolerance, Professor Bollinger's analysis of the toler-
ance concern is almost irrelevant. Even without reference to the
Tolerance Model, a judge would conclude that the Nazis' speech
was presumptively protected. 47 The remainder of Professor Bol-
linger's analysis explores the harms involved in the case. This
assessment of harm, however, naturally says nothing about toler-
ance. In addition, we would note that Professor Bollinger does
not insist that the Tolerance Model means that we should adopt
a new framework for analysis in which we only look at the toler-
ance-teaching benefits of permitting extremist speech. Professor
Bollinger essentially employs the same balancing approach
adopted by the Supreme Court in recent opinions.
CONCLUSION
Irrespective of the practical value of Professor Bollinger's
work, his book deserves reading. Writing on the first amendment
can often be tortured or dense. Professor Bollinger makes his
work more accessible by providing frequent summaries and ex-
tensive footnotes, both welcome aids to the reader. Professor
Bollinger also has an engaging style, with an especially nice ear
for metaphor.4 9 Finally, his frequent reference to the Skokie case
provides a continuity seldom found in free speech materials.
It may be somewhat unfair to emphasize the practical
problems with Professor Bollinger's work. Naturally, a novel
perspective such as his requires extensive refinement. Perhaps it
is his intent to do that refinement in later works.50 Such a devel-
opment should not be surprising. No doubt he rightfully aspires
to add a unique perspective to the literature on free speech, an
area that "has attracted what seems like a disproportionate
47. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that Nazi
demonstration is within basic right of free speech).
48. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 879-82 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (balancing limits on free expres-
sion against state authority to regulate education); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (weighing corporation's interest in expressing views on public
issues against various asserted harms).
49. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 2, at 4 ("The First Amendment landscape has both
grown dramatically in size and been subdivided into many plots.").
50. Id. at 11 (referring to the inquiry as "preliminary").
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share of the most beautiful writing to be found anywhere in the
law.,,
5 1
51. Id. at 213.
